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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of both labor market conditions and asset poverty on the property
crimes involvement of American males. Since the mid 60’s the property crimes arrest rate has been
four times higher for black males if compared to white ones. Another set of stylised facts show for
the ﬁrst demographic group lower educational levels and worse labor market outcomes, with the
African Americans supplying less hours of labor, gaining lower wages, experiencing both higher
unemployment duration and rates. At the same time, more than 30% of black households had a
negative net worth. A dynamic general equilibrium model is developed, exploiting these facts to
quantitatively assess the race crime gap, that is the diﬀerence in crime explained by the diﬀerence
in observables. The model is calibrated relying on US data and solved numerically. The model
captures well relevant dimensions of the crime phenomenon, such as the inmates composition by
race, employment status and education. Simulation results show that the observed poverty and
labor market outcomes account for as much as 90% of the arrest rates ratio. Finally the model is
used to compare two alternative policy experiments aimed at reducing the aggregate crime rate:
increasing the expenditure on police seems to be cost eﬀective, when compared to an equally
expensive lump-sum subsidy targeted to the high school dropouts.
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11 Introduction
In the US a striking fact about property crimes is the high participation of one minority group: the
African American males. For example, data from the Bureau of Justice Statitics show that in 1996 the
property crimes arrest rate (per 1.000 males) was equal to 5,35 for white males and 24,0 for black ones.
In the same year 2% of the US white population was under correctional supervision, while the same
ﬁgure for blacks was 8.9%. Such drastic gaps can be explained in several ways. If, for some reasons,
legitimate economic opportunities are correlated with demographic traits, the group facing the worse
situation can resort to crime more often, to partially overcome the economic disadvantage, as discussed
in Bound and Freeman (1992) and Anderson (1999). Alternatively, peer eﬀects and social interactions
among people belonging to the same demographic group can inﬂuence heavily criminal choices, as
proposed by Sah (1991) and Glaser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996). Finally, it can be claimed
that the criminal justice system has practices which are discriminatory with respect to minorities,
a hypothesis tested for example in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) and Hernandez-Murillo and
Knowles (2004).
This paper takes the ﬁrst point of view, assessing the importance of both labor market conditions
and asset poverty in accounting for the observed racial crime gap. In an environment with no peer ef-
fects or discriminatory criminal justice, this contribution quantitatively evaluates to what extent worse
legal opportunities can be considered responsible for the high crime involvement of black American
males. An equilibrium model of rational crime participation is developed to study the impact of more
diﬀuse poverty, higher unemployment rates, lower educational achievements, lower wages and lower
labor supply on the crime behavior of black males in the US. The analysis considers only property
crimes, or the class of crimes that are more likely to be motivated by an economic evaluation of the
potential gains, i.e. the value of the stolen goods, and costs, i.e. the chances of being apprehended to-
gether with the severity of the punishment.1 The theoretical model extends Becker (1968) framework
to a dynamic environment, along the lines of Flinn (1986) and Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004).
It then exploits the information related to the labor market characteristics to quantitatively assess the
diﬀerences in crime behaviors between agents facing diﬀerent legitimate opportunities, namely blacks
and whites.
An inﬁnitely lived agents model is developed, allowing for several layers of heterogeneity: race
(synthesized by the labor market opportunities), education, employment status and asset holdings.
1In order to focus on crimes that are mainly driven by economic forces, violent crimes are neglected altogether.
Property crimes (deﬁned as the sum of burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts and robberies) reported to the police
and included in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports have historically accounted for more than 90% of total known crimes
in the US.
2Each dimension of heterogeneity is a channel that gives diﬀerent incentives to commit a property
crime: these are studied altogether and, by means of counterfactual analysis, one at a time. Given
the richness of the model, an analytical solution cannot be obtained: the model is calibrated relying
on US data and solved numerically.
Simulation results show that the observed poverty and labor market outcomes account for as much
as 90% of the arrest rates ratio. The model captures well relevant dimensions of the crime phenomenon,
such as the inmates composition by race, employment status and education. The equilibrium features
of the analysis allow to perform counterfactual analysis with an endogenous response of the individuals
to diﬀerent public policies. The calibrated model is used to compare two alternative policy experiments
aimed at reducing the aggregate crime rate: increasing the expenditure on police seems to be cost
eﬀective, when compared to an equally expensive lump-sum subsidy targeted to the high school
dropouts.
The following section surveys the literature related to this paper.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to at least two strands of literature, the ﬁrst one being the studies on the
economics of race and the labor market, the second one being the economics literature on crime.
As for the economic analysis of the diﬀerent labor market conditions according to race, the empirical
literature in particular is vast. Here the focus will be on the black-white diﬀerentials only.2 Some
of the most relevant contributions are Altonji and Blank (1999), Donohue and Heckman (1991) and
Neal and Johnson (1996).3
Altonji and Blank (1999) provide extensive empirical evidence on the diﬀerentials by race in the
US labor market in the recent past. They discuss and test the theories of discrimination developed in
the literature, suggesting that some discrimination is indeed at work. However, from this survey, it
seems safe to conclude that there is no consensus on the magnitude of this phenomenon.
Donohue and Heckman (1991) study how the economic status of blacks relative to whites has been
improving from the 40’s to the late 60’s, eventually stagnating from the mid 70’s. The authors explain
the more recent lack of convergence in the economic outcomes of the two demographic groups with
the decline in the relative wages paid to unskilled versus skilled workers that has occurred in that
2We can justify this choice by noting that in the US hyspanic people show labor market outcomes which are halfway
from the blacks and whites. Also their involvement in property crimes is in this middle position. Moreover, blacks and
whites account for more than 90% of the prison population.
3This list is by no means exaustive. For a more comprehensive one see the references included in the papers mentioned
here.
3period of time.
Finally, Neal and Johnson (1996) ﬁnd that the discrimination in the labor market is very limited,
once among the determinants of wages a control for workers’ skills (i.e. the AFQT test) is included.
They argue that the wage gap reﬂects mainly a skill gap, in turn determined by diﬀerent family
backgrounds and school environments, that is by premarket factors.
In this respect, notice that the model will be silent on the origins of the labor market diﬀerentials
by race. In this sense, it can be considered consistent with both a diﬀerence in the quantity of human
capital and a discrimination behavior determining the diﬀerent labor market conditions.
As for the literature on crime, it is possible to distinguish between the mainly empirical contribu-
tions and the mainly theoretical ones. From an empirical point of view, there have been quite a few
studies assessing the eﬀects of unemployment rates on property crimes. The eﬀect has been found
to be consistently positive, even though some studies claim that it is small in size.4 The empirical
evidence discussed in Lochner (2004) and Lochner and Moretti (2004) shows that the bulk of property
crimes are committed by people with poor educational achievements, with the high school dropouts
being the most crime prone group. As for the role of race as a determinant of property crimes, the
ﬁndings appear to be more controversial. More in detail, some studies ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of be-
longing to a minority, e.g. Grogger (1998) and Witte and Tauchen (1994), some other studies do not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect, e.g. Lochner (1999), and some others ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of race on
the participation in criminal activities depending on the speciﬁcation adopted, e.g. Kelly (2000) and
Levitt (1996). Notice that a potentially important variable that is missing in all these studies is a
measure of individual wealth.
Both the theoretical and quantitative research on the economics of crime have been particularly
active in the recent years. Some contributions of interest are Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003), Glaser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000), Imrohoroglu, Merlo and
Rupert (2004), Persico (2002) and Verdier and Zenou (2004).
Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003) extend the standard search theoretic framework to allow for
criminal activities. They study the eﬀect of crime on both unemployment and inequality, showing
that the possibility of committing a crime has non trivial eﬀects on both variables.
In Glaser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) social interactions are introduced in order to explain
the high variance of crime rates in cities and over time. They specify and estimate a model where
agents imitate the behavior of people living close to them. Their estimates suggest the presence of
social interactions.
The contribution of Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000) studies the endogenous determination
4See for instance the papers by Witte and Tauchen (1994) and Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001).
4of crime, redistribution and police expenditure in a majority voting political economy framework.
They analyze how these variables are aﬀected by changes in the income distribution and the criminal
apprehension technology. Their framework accounts for the correlation among redistribution, police
expenditure and property crimes observed in the US data.
Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004) study in a OLG model which factors account for the
oscillating behavior of the US property crime rate observed in the mid 70’s to mid 90’s years. They
show that the aging of the population, the stronger economy and the higher apprehension probability
explain the drastic drop in the aggregate crime rate that took place in the 90’s.
Persico (2002) studies the eﬀect of racial proﬁling by police in the search for criminals. This study
shows that a fair system, that is a system that audits diﬀerent racial groups with the same intensity,
can lead to a lower amount of crime if compared to an unfair system.
To conclude with, Verdier and Zenou (2004) demonstrate how stereotypical beliefs on crime in-
volvement together with location in a city can lead to a discriminatory equilibrium, with the minority
group committing more crimes, living further away from productive activities and earning lower wages.
The mechanism at work in this economy is of the self-fulﬁlling type.
As a ﬁnal remark, notice that none of these papers deals with race, poverty, labor market conditions
and property crimes in a quantitative framework, which is the focus of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some stylized facts related to
crime behaviors and labor market conditions for the male population in the US. The theoretical model
is presented in section 3, while section 4 is devoted to the deﬁnition of the equilibrium concept used
in the model: the recursive stationary competitive equilibrium. Section 5 presents the calibration
used in the simulations. Section 6 provides the main results and predictions of the baseline model,
including the comparison of two policy experiments and the discussion of counterfactual analysis.
Section 7 concludes. The algorithm used for the solution of the model and some computational details
are described in appendix A. A further discussion of the data can be found in appendix B.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section we document and discuss some stylized facts about property crime involvement in the
US.
Figure (1) plots the time series of the property crimes arrest rates by race from 1965 to 2001.
These data are collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and are expressed as the number of
property crimes arrests for 100.000 individuals belonging to that race. From the ﬁgure we can see
5that both races have shown similar trends over time, possibly suggesting that a) the police did not
change its apprehension strategy, b) people of diﬀerent races respond to the same incentives as far as
property crimes are concerned. However, the levels are drastically diﬀerent: for whites, the arrest rate
has been oscillating from 300 to 650, while for blacks from 1.464 to 3.180. Even though there seems
to be a slow convergence taking place, ﬁgure (2) tells us that the arrest rate ratio is still above 4.
[Figure (1) about here]
[Figure (2) about here]
Figure (3) merges data taken from the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
and the U.S. Census Bureau. This ﬁgure plots the property crime rates reported to the police in the
year 2000 in each American state versus the share of black people living in those states.5 This graph
can only suggest a positive correlation between the two variables. States with higher black people
shares also tend to have higher property crime rates, the sample correlation being equal to 0.49 if
Washington DC is included in the sample and to 0.34 if it is excluded.6 Obviously, this simple plot
cannot imply any causal link from one variable to the other. One more feature suggested by the plot
is the presence of a fairly high degree of non linearity in the data. A linear regression with a common
speciﬁcation in the literature displays an R2 equal to 0.4, with race being signiﬁcant across several
speciﬁcations.7
[Figure (3) about here]
Another source of information on the diﬀerentials in crime participation between blacks and whites
in the US is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).8 Table 1 shows a variable included in
5For a detailed deﬁnition of property crimes see appendix B.
6This relation appears to be stable over time. Moreover, the sample including DC could provide a better representa-
tion of this phenomenon, being DC a metropolitan aerea. Indeed, data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics show that
the vast majority of property crimes are perpetrated in metropolitan areas, while data from the Current Population
Survey show that in 1996 black households lived mostly in metropolitan areas with at least one million of residents (the
precise ﬁgure is 60%, versus only 45% of white households). See appendix B for the corresponding plot using data from
the US cities with a population of at least 200000 people.
7The dependent variable is the property crime rate and the regressors are the per capita income, the male unem-
ployment rate, the share of people between 16 and 24 years old, the per capita justice expenditure, the percentage of
people below the poverty line, the share of black residents, the percentage of high school dropouts and a constant.
8See appendix B for more details on this survey.
6the NCVS. This provides information about robberies: a sample of persons victim of a robbery were
asked to identify the race of the criminals attacking them. Table 1 refers to robberies carried out by
a single oﬀender.
The Table shows an interesting pattern: irrespective of the decline in the number of total robberies
over time, black individuals were recognized to be the oﬀenders in a robbery far more often than
people belonging to other races. Moreover, not only these ﬁgures do not simply reﬂect the share of
black people in the population (around 12%), but also they represent the highest rate.
[Table 1 about here]
So far only indirect evidence of the crime involvement of African Americans has been provided.
Two longitudinal studies, the NLSY79 and the NLSY97, represent a source of more direct evidence:
the young people randomly selected in the samples were asked whether they participated into criminal
activities and, if so, in which crimes.
As for the NLSY79, the original sample consisted of 14-22 year-old people and the questionnaire
included only in the year 1980 a self administered section with questions on crime involvement. These
data show that no clear racial pattern arises. However, subsequent cross validation studies suggested
that black respondents underreported their crime participation, Freeman (1999).9
As for the NLSY97, the original sample consisted of 12-16 year-old people. In each round the
questionnaire has included self administered questions on the crime involvement of the respondent.
Table 2 reports the data for the year 2001.10 Similarly to the NLSY79 black youths did not report
to participate into property crimes strikingly more often than white youths, even though they tend
to show a slightly higher involvement, as Table 2 shows.
[Table 2 about here]
A possible interpretation of this result calls for the short labor market experience of the youths in
the NLSY97.
Finally, on a more indirect ground, from the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional
Facilities, 40.4% of the prison population in 1997 convicted because of property crimes consisted of
9A detailed description of the criminal activities by race of the NLSY79 respondents is contained in Grogger (1998),
table 2 pag. 769.
10The year 2001 was selected in order for all the people in the sample to be old enough to participate in the labor
market.
7black males, while they represented only 11.4% of the male population.11 It would be possible to
argue that the judicial system is racially biased, as in Donohue and Levitt (2001): this is not the line
of research pursued here. In this work it is assumed that the judicial system is fair, or that it is blind
to race. Irrispective of his race, every criminal faces the same probability of being caught.
[Figure (4) about here]
The empirical evidence presented above focuses on the crime involvement of the two main racial
groups in the US. Next, some stylized facts about both the economic conditions and the labor market
outcomes for the same racial groups are presented.
Figure (4) reports the time series for the unemployment rates of white and black males 20 years
old and over (data are from the Bureau of labor Statistics) in the period 1976-2003. The top line
represents the black unemployment rate. What is striking in the graph is the stable relationship
between the two unemployment rates. Black males have suﬀered an unemployment rate which has
always been at least twice as much as the corresponding ﬁgure for white males.12 Beside the higher
incidence of unemployment, black males have consistently had also longer average unemployment spell.
Figure (5) plots the time series for both the average and median unemployment durations, expressed
in weeks. Another sharp diﬀerence between blacks and whites is related to the rewards in the labor
market. As reported in Altonji and Blank (1999), data from the March 1996 CPS show that there
was a substantial gap in annual earnings: white males earned on average $36,169, while black males
earned as little as $23,645. Obviously, part of these gaps are explained by the diﬀerent educational
achievements of the two groups. In 1996, 14.56% (20.17%) of white (black) males did not have a high
school degree, 58.37% (65.14%) had at least a high school degree but did not had a college one and
27.06% (14.68%) had at least a college degree. These facts suggest that black males have experienced
worse labor market conditions and outcomes in the recent past. On a diﬀerent perspective, relying on
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Wolﬀ (1998) has provided evidence on the racial wealth
disparities: the average asset holdings of white households has been around ﬁve times higher than
the corresponding ﬁgure for black households in the last 20 years. Large wealth diﬀerentials might be
due to diﬀerences in inheritances, as studied by Altonji and Doraszelski (2005), or by diﬀerent rates
of enterpreneurship, as discussed in Fairlie and Meyer (1996). Moreover, Wolﬀ (2000) shows that in
11According to the US Bureau of Justice, in 1995 more than 90% of the prison and jail population consisted of males.
This suggests to drop women from the relevant population, in order to focus on the main forces driving the decisions of
becoming a criminal.
12Notice that considering the unemployment rates by education groups does not alter the picture.
81995 31.3% black households had a negative value for the net worth, while the percentage for white
households was 15%.
[Figure (5) about here]
From this set of empirical facts it is possible to argue that African Americans face very diﬀerent
incentives to commit a property crime if compared to the white population. The next section develops
a theoretical model aimed both at exploiting these stylized facts and explaining the higher involvement
of African Americans in illegitimate activities. Notice that the concept of race adopted is extremely
naive. It is a characteristic which is perfectly observable by all economic agents at no costs and relates
only to diﬀerent legitimate opportunities.
3 The Baseline Model
In this section we propose a dynamic general equilibrium model of crime, along the lines of Im-
rohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004), with inﬁnitely lived heterogeneous agents.13 It extends the
framework proposed by Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) to include an endogenous crime choice,
agents belonging to two diﬀerent races (i.e. Blacks/Whites), three levels of education (i.e. high school
dropouts, high school degree and college or higher degree), a self-ﬁnancing unemployment insurance
beneﬁts scheme and a self-ﬁnancing judicial system. The model is framed in an incomplete markets
environment. More speciﬁcally, agents in the economy face three idiosyncratic risks: 1) being unem-
ployed, 2) being victim of a property crime, and 3) going to jail if involved in property crimes. The
former is assumed to be uninsurable, the second is insurable in a competitive market and the latter is
not, since it is the outcome of a public policy.14 As for the former assumption, it is a well know fact
that felons convicted because of a property crime were more likely to be unemployed at the time of
the oﬀense. Together with the usual arguments motivating incomplete markets, this state dependent
outcome suggests that people cannot fully insure against the unemployment risk.15 Time is discrete
and the economy lasts forever.
13Other GE models of crime are developed in Fender (1999), Furlong (1987), Grossman (1995), Sala-i-Martin (1992).
An interesting partial equilibrium contribution is Davis (1988).
14The assumption of insurability of property crimes is made mainly to keep the notation simple. In previous versions
of the model we assumed that alle risks were uninsurable, obtaining results with no relevant diﬀerences.
15An alternative explanation could be linked to ability. People of low ability could be more likely to be unemployed
hence they could self select into criminal activities, showing at the same time high incarceration and unemployment
rates. For the latter kind of argument to go through, the concept of ability adopted should be a kind of ability rewarded
by the labor market, but not necessarily linked to the criminal ability. Otherwise less able criminals would spend more
time in jail, making crime economically less attractive.
93.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by inﬁnitely lived agents whose measure is normalized to one.16 Agents are
ex-ante heterogenous with respect to both their race and their educational achievement. Race is de-
noted with ra ∈ RA = {wh,bl} while education level is denoted with ed ∈ ED = {hsd,hs,col}. More
in detail, agents of diﬀerent race/education pairs diﬀer in the probability and duration of employ-
ment opportunities, exogenous labor supply hra,ed and labor eﬃciency units εra,ed. The parameter
ψra,ed represents the share of (ra,ed) workers. Obviously the shares must add up to one, that is
￿
ra,ed
ψra,ed = 1. There is no population growth and the ψra,ed do not change over time. As mentioned
before, in this framework race boils down to exogenous labor market related characteristics and en-
dogenous asset distributions. Notice also that at this stage there is no feedback from the criminal
market to the labor market.
3.2 Preferences
Agents’ preferences are assumed to be represented by a time separable utility function U(.). Agents’
utility is deﬁned over stochastic consumption sequences {ct}
∞
t=0: their aim is to choose how much to
consume (ct), how much to save in an interest bearing asset (at+1) and how many property crimes to
commit (crt) in each period of their lives, in order to maximize their objective function.17 The agents












where E0 represents the expectation operator over all the possible histories generated by the employ-
ment opportunity shocks (s ∈ S = {e,u}), the probability of apprehension if crimes are committed
(πa) and the probability of being a victim of property crimes carried out by other agents (πv); β ∈ (0,1)
is the subjective discount factor. We assume that u(.) : C → R, the period utility function, is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada conditions. Notice that there is no direct disutility
neither from work nor from incarceration, hence labor supply is ﬁxed.
16The inﬁnitely lived agents assumption is made to give both the wealth distribution and the exogenous borrowing
limits a sharper role, without resorting to arbitrary assumptions on the initial wealth distribution, assumptions that
would be needed in a standard OLG framework.
17With some abuse of notation, in the sequential representation of the problem we dropped the history of shocks
￿
ht￿





t=0 and similarly for savings
and property crimes.
103.3 Endowments
Agents are all born with the same asset endowment a0.18 In every period they can be employed (e)
or unemployed (u). If employed they supply inelastically a constant fraction of their time endowment
(hra,ed). The stochastic employment opportunities follow a two state ﬁrst order Markov process. The
transition function of the employment opportunity state is represented by the race/education depen-
dent matrices Πra,ed (s,s￿) = [πra,ed (i,j)], where each element πra,ed (i,j) is deﬁned as πra,ed (i,j) =
Pr{st+1 = j|st = i}, i,j = {e, u}.19 Finally, every agent is endowed with exogenous eﬃciency units
denoted as εra,ed.
3.4 Property Crimes
Every agent can engage in property crimes in every period of his life, irrespective of his employment
opportunity. The modeling strategy related to the crime choice generalizes ?. There exists a criminal
technology, y (cr), that maps the number of crimes into criminal earnings. We assume that committing
crimes corresponds to stealing a constant fraction η of the average non-asset income in the economy
y times the number of crimes cr. That is, we assume that y (cr) = ηycr. Notice that y￿ (cr) > 0
and y(0) = 0, that is the technology is linear and people who decide not to be involved in property
crimes get zero illegal income. A crime attempt is always successful. However, with probability
πa (cr) criminals are caught and incarcerated at the beginning of the period, while with probability
(1 − πa (cr)) they remain free and can use the additional economic resources ηycr, obtained through
theft. For simplicity assume a linear relationship for the probability of apprehension πa(cr) = πacr,
with 0 ≤ πa ≤ 1 being a parameter. Notice that committing crimes does not entail any direct cost,
neither monetary nor in terms of time; the only cost is the opportunity cost of being apprehended.
With endogenous probability πv (which in equilibrium corresponds to the aggregate crime rate) an
agent is victim of a crime and loses ηy units of his income.20 Notice that we assume that an agent
can be victimized at most once in a period of time. Moreover, both the criminal earnings function
and the apprehension technology are the same for every agent in the economy.
18Notice that the speciﬁc initial value does not play any role, since the analysis will focus on stationary equilibria,
which do not depend on the initial condition.
19Hereafter the prime symbol ￿ denotes future variables.
20This assumption is justiﬁed from the data contained in the NCVS: somewhat surprisingly, there is a zero correlation
between the victim’s income and the amount stolen.
113.5 Government
The role of the government in this economy is twofold.
On the one side it runs the unemployment insurance beneﬁts scheme, by taxing the labor income
of the employed workers at rate τU and subsidizing the unemployed workers at the replacement rate
φ. φ is a policy parameter exogenously given, while τU is set residually to ensure a self-ﬁnancing
scheme.
On the other side, the government runs the legal system, providing the apprehension technology
that allows to detect and punish a fraction πacr of the crimes committed. The justice system is costly
and we assume that there is a cost J per arrest made.
Detected criminals are immediately incarcerated: while in prison they all consume a constant level
ca. J consists of both inmates consumption and other expenditures (e.g. judicial expenditures), which
are ﬁnanced through a proportional labor income tax τJ paid by all the agents in the economy. Also
τJ is set such that the scheme is self-ﬁnancing.
3.6 Technology
The production side of the model is extremely simple. There is a constant returns to scale technology
of the Cobb-Douglas form, which relies on aggregate capital K and labor L to produce the ﬁnal output
Y .21
Y = F(K,L) = BKαL1−α.
Capital depreciates at the exogenous rate δ and ﬁrms hire capital and labor every period from
competitive markets. From the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm we obtain the expression for the net













21Since the analysis will focus on steady-states only, time indexes are omitted, for the sake of notational clarity.
123.7 Other market arrangements
The ﬁnal good market is competitive. Moreover, every agent must satisfy an exogenous borrowing
limit, denoted by d ≥ bra. Notice that we allow for borrowing limits to be race dependent. Finally,
it is not possible to insure against the unemployment shock, while all agents buy a property crime
insurance at price pI.
3.8 Timing
The timing of the model is assumed to be the following: 1) The idiosyncratic unemployment shocks
are realized and observed by the agents; 2) Production takes place, with the employed people working
for a wage and with the unemployed receiving the subsidy; 3) The crime, consumption and saving
decisions are taken; 4) A random fraction of criminals are caught and immediately incarcerated; 5)
Inmates get out of jail.
Notice that by assumption the implied model period length corresponds to the average time spent
in prison by a criminal: hence, the population eligible to work is stationary and equal to 1 in every
period.
4 Equilibrium
In this section we ﬁrst deﬁne the problems of the employed and unemployed workers in their recursive
representation, then we provide a formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium concept used in this model.
Notice that the vector representing the individual state variables is deﬁned as x = (ra,ed,a,s), whose
entries are race ra ∈ RA = {wh,bl}, education level ed ∈ ED = {hsd,hs,col}, individual asset
holdings a ∈ A = [d,∞) and employment status s ∈ S = {e,u}. The optimal value functions are
deﬁned as Vi (a,s), where for notational simplicity i ∈ RA × ED. The stationary distributions over
the vector x are denoted as µi (a,s).
4.1 Households’ Problem
4.1.1 Problem of the unemployed workers
The value function for the unemployed workers of a given race/education pair i and with asset holding
equal to a can be written as:




s￿ πi (u,s￿)Vi(a￿,s￿)} (3)
13More in detail
Vi (a,u) = maxa￿,cr {[1 − πa(cr)]u((1 + r)a + (1 − τJ)φwhiεi + y(cr) − a￿ − pI)+
πa(cr)u(ca) + β
￿
s￿ πi (u,s￿){[1 − πa(cr)]Vi(a￿,s￿) + πa(cr)Vi(a,s￿)}}
s.t.
a0 given, c ≥ 0, a￿ ≥ d, cr ≥ 0
Notice that we have substituted the explicit expression for the current expected utility Eu(c) =
[1 − πa(cr)]u(c)+πa(cr)u(ca), the expected continuation values and the individual budget constraint
c + a￿ + pI ≤ (1 + r)a + (1 − τJ)φwhiεi + y(cr).
4.1.2 Problem of the employed workers
The value function for the employed workers can be written as:




s￿ πi (e,s￿)Vi(a￿,s￿)} (4)
More in detail,
Vi (a,e) = maxa￿,cr {(1 − πa(cr))u((1 + r)a + (1 − τU − τJ)whiεi + y(cr) − a￿ − pI)+
πa(cr)u(ca) + β
￿
s￿ πi (e,s￿){[1 − πa(cr)]Vi(a￿,s￿) + πa(cr)Vi(a,s￿)}}
s.t.
a0 given, c ≥ 0, a￿ ≥ d, cr ≥ 0
Notice that the individual budget constraint in this case reads c+a￿+pI ≤ (1 + r)a+(1 − τU − τJ)whiεi+
y(cr).
14Is it worth stressing the assumption that if a criminal is detected he is immediately convicted. To
avoid prisons to act as a forced savings mechanism, we assume that the legal resources of a criminal
are seized and destroyed by the government. It follows that convicted felons cannot rely on their
earned legal income for their consumption/saving plans. More precisely, in this case, savings are equal
to the current asset level, or a￿ = a.
It is now possible to deﬁne the recursive competitive equilibrium. Moreover, the analysis will be
restricted to steady-states only, that is to prices, endogenous variables and distributions over the state
variables which are stationary over time.
4.2 Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 For a given set of policies {φ;ca}, apprehension probability πa, cost per arrest J,
race/education shares ψi, labor supplies hi and eﬃciency units εi, a recursive stationary equilib-
rium is a set of individual decision rules {ci(a,s),a￿
i(a,s),cri(a,s)}, value functions {Vi(a,s)}, prices
{r,w,pI}, taxes {τU,τJ}, average labor income y, aggregate victimization rate πv, cost of criminal
justice J and stationary distributions {µi(a,s)} such that:22
• Relative factor prices {r,w} solve the ﬁrm’s problem and satisfy equations (1)-(2).
• Given relative prices {r,w,pI}, government policies {φ;ca}, taxes {τU,τJ} and {πa,πv,y,J,ψi,hi,εi},
the individual policy functions {ci(a,s),a￿
i(a,s),cri(a,s)}, solve the households problem (3)-(4)
and {Vi(a,s)} are the associated value functions.

















• The ﬁnal good market clears:
22ci(a,s) : A × S → R+ denotes the consumption functions, a￿
i(a,s) : A × S → A denotes the saving functions and












[1 − πacri(a,s)]ci(a,s)dµi(a,s) + δK + J.














In equilibrium the measure of agents of each race in each state is time invariant and consistent with
individual decisions.























ysdµi(a,s), with ye = (1 − τU − τJ)w, yu = (1 − τJ)φw.








, with ye = w, yu = φw.
or the revenues from this tax cover for all the criminal justice expenses.














that is the proportional tax rate τU is set such that the total expenditure for unemployment
beneﬁts are exactly equal to the revenues from taxation.
16• The price for the property crime insurance pI is equal to:
pI = ηyπv
Since by assumption the insurance sector is competitive, the price pI depends only on the proba-
bility of being hit by a criminal and the amount stolen.
5 Calibration and Computation
The model is calibrated relying on US data, focusing only on males of age 16 and above in the labor
force.
One model period corresponds to the average prison term in the baseline year, or 12.3 months
in 1996.23 Notice that the choice of the model period allows for every person in the economy to be
eligible to work in every period of time.





1−σ , with σ = 1.0.
In order to pin down the eﬃciency units parameters εra,ed, we used the Current Population Survey
(CPS) monthly data for 1996. More in detail for each month we run a linear regression with log wages
as a dependent variable together with a constant term, a set of education dummies and a dummy for
race as regressors.24 The reference group consisted of the whites high school dropouts. After taking
the average of the parameters, from the predicted values of the regression we get the proﬁle for the
eﬃciency units, which is as follows: εwh,hsd=1.62, εwh,hs=2.07, εwh,col=2.42, εbl,hsd=1.4, εbl,hs=1.78
and εbl,col=2.09.
The exogenous labor supply hra,ed was computed as follows. From the CPS we obtained the average
hours worked for each education/race pair. Following the literature on the time use, the average hours
worked in the population was set to match the average share of available time devoted to market
activities, that is 0.4. Rescaling the hours worked according to this value gives the following parameters
hwh,hsd=0.369, hwh,hs=0.407, hwh,col=0.426, hbl,hsd=0.355, hbl,hs=0.382, and hbl,col=0.401.
Again from the 1996 CPS, data related to the unemployment rates by race and education cat-
egory allow to pin down the entries of the transition matrices Πra,ed for the Markov-chain. We do
23The year 1996 was chosen because the observed crime rate was close to the average rate over the period 1970-2000.
24Being the model an inﬁnitely lived agents, there is no explicit role for age. However, we estimated an alternative
and more common speciﬁcation which included also age and age squared as regressors. We then computed the eﬃciency
parameters by substituting the relevant average age. The ﬁnal results were quite similar to the ones in the text.
17not allow for state dependence of the unemployment shock, i.e. the probability of future unemploy-
ment is the same irrespective of the current occupational status. Figures for unemployment rates
in 1996 were πwh,hsd (.,u￿)=10.2%, πwh,hs (.,u￿)=4.32%, πwh,col (.,u￿)=2.18%, πbl,hsd (.,u￿)=19.7%,
πbl,hs (.,u￿)=10.29% and πbl,col (.,u￿)=3.82%.
The race/education shares are obtained from the CPS, which gives the following values ψwh,hsd=12.89%,
ψwh,hs=51.67%, ψwh,col=23.95%, ψbl,hsd=2.32%, ψbl,hs=7.48% and ψbl,col=1.69%.
In the simulations the exogenous borrowing limit d is set at diﬀerent levels for the two races.
The values are chosen for the model to replicate in equilibrium the share of agents with negative net
worth. As reported in Wolﬀ (2000), table 7, in 1995 31.3% black households had a negative value
for the net worth, while the percentage for white households was 15%. The values bbl = −1.151
and bwh = −0.655 allow to replicate these ﬁgures. This point deserves further discussion. First,
even though there is some evidence of racial discrimination in credit markets, there are no deﬁnitive
answers on the matter. Furthermore, our calibration strategy goes in the opposite direction of a natural
borrowing limit concept, as in Aiyagari (1994). Having black agents lower legitimate earnings, relying
on a natural borrowing limit would imply a borrowing limit more stringent for black agents than for
whites. Notice, however, that the values for the borrowing limits we are imposing are more stringent
than the ones implied by the natural borrowing limit concept.
We normalize the average disposable legitimate earnings y to 1. This is done by setting the TFP
parameter B equal to 1.047. The actual value in 1996 was $28,513.
Following ? the exogenous consumption when in jail ca is set at $2,600, i.e. this leads to ca =
0.0984.25
The policy parameter φ, i.e. the replacement rate, is set in order to replicate the actual unem-
ployment beneﬁt scheme operating in the US, i.e. φ=0.5.
From the FBI Uniform Crime Reports in 1996 we obtain the number of property crimes cleared
with the arrest of the felon. From the NCVS, we compute the total number of property crimes
committed in 1996.26 Accordingly, the apprehension probability per crime is set at πa = 0.0492. The
parameter related to the earnings from crime is set to η = 0.0439, to replicate the value of $1,253, the
average value of a property crime computed from the Uniform Crime Reports in 1996.
The cost of justice J is estimated to be $10,610, i.e. J = 0.3721. This estimate is obtained as
follows. The actual expenditures on judicial, legal activities and corrections for 1996 are weighted by
the appropriate percentages of property crimes, i.e. 14.39% for the ﬁrst two and 31% for the last.
This gives a total justice expenditure for property crimes equal to 24 billions. This amount is divided
25Notice that in the calibrated economy there will be no agents with a total legitimate income less than ca. The
lowest value of legitimate disposable income is 0.2.
26The NCVS is considered to give more reliable estimates for property crime victimisation of the american households.
18by the total number of property crimes cleared with an arrest in 1996, giving the value of $10,610.27
Both for the capital share parameter and the depreciation one, consensus values are used: α = 0.36
and δ = 0.08. Finally, we set the subjective discount rate β = 0.958, to get an equilibrium interest
rate in all computations at a value of about 4% on an annual basis.
The complete parameterization of the model is reported in Table 3.28
[Table 3 about here]
6 Results
This section starts presenting the optimal policy functions for both black and white agents. Then it
moves on to describe the results related to the crime rates.
6.1 Policy Functions
In this simple model we have only three sets of decision rules: the saving functions, the consumption
functions and the crime ones. These are considered in turn.
6.1.1 Saving Functions
Figures (6) and (7) show the saving decisions and the 45-degree line for both blacks and whites
high school dropouts. One property of these functions is worth noticing: suﬃciently poor unemployed
individuals are borrowing constrained, while employed ones are not. Another property worth stressing
is that these functions are non-decreasing. Unlike in simpler models, this is not guaranteed to hold.
Actually, for quite extreme parameterizations, the saving functions become non monotone: they ﬁrst
decrease and then start to increase again. This pattern is due to the interaction between the saving
choice and the crime one. The intuition is simple. In the model only individuals with low asset
levels choose to commit crimes. This decision provides them with additional resources: part of these
are spent to buy the consumption good, part of them are saved. As the individuals get richer, they
need to resort less and less on stealing, explaining the decreasing part of the function. As the crime
involvement vanishes, a more standard behavior is restored.
27Notice that ca is part of J.
28For more details on the computational procedures see the appendix A.
19[Figure (6) about here]
[Figure (7) about here]
An interesting comment can be framed in a standard precautionary savings argument. For a given
educational level, black individuals know that they will experience bad labor market conditions, as
represented by the high unemployment rate. Since they are risk averse, they tend to accumulate
assets, in order to smooth consumption over the possible states of the world: by doing this, when a
bad shock is realized, they have enough resources to keep the consumption proﬁle suﬃciently stable
and avoid the borrowing constraint. This buﬀer stock strategy can lead some blacks to consume less
and save more than the whites. However, at the same time, black individuals receive an extremely
low labor income that do not allow them to save much. If on the one hand higher unemployment
rates increase the incentive to commit a property crime for black individuals, on the other hand they
tend to reduce the likelihood of this choice, since agents are induced to save a higher proportion of
their income.
It is important to recall that the intersection between the 45-degree line and the saving function for
employed agents gives the highest level of assets that in equilibrium the individuals will hold. These
intersections occur in regions of the asset space that are not reported in the graphs: this was done
only to make the ﬁgures visually clear.
Notice that the saving functions qualitative behavior is the same for all education levels, hence we
avoid to report them.
6.1.2 Consumption Functions
Figure (8) plots the consumption functions for black individuals who are either high school dropouts
or college graduate, for both occupational possibilities. Two things are interesting in this graph. First,
for a given educational level, the consumption function of the unemployed is below the employed one,
with the distance decreasing in the level of assets. Second, by comparing the consumption functions
of the agents with diﬀerent education, they are unsurprisingly increasing in the education level. What
is less obvious is that, for low level of assets, the distance between consumption when employed and
unemployed is lower for the high school dropouts. This is again due to the higher involvement in
crime of people with a low educational attainment.
[Figure (8) about here]
206.1.3 Crime Functions
[Figure (9) about here]
In this subsection we move to consider the criminal behaviors implied by the model economy.
Figure (9) plots the crime decision rules for black unemployed agents. The number of crimes depends
heavily on both the educational level and the degree of poverty. Higher educational achievements and
higher asset levels imply less crimes. Consider in more detail the most crime prone group: black high
school dropouts. Figure (10) depicts their choices. It is interesting to notice that for this demographic
group also employed agents resort to crime relatively often.
By comparing ﬁgures (10) and (11) we can appreciate some positive predictions of the model. If
compared to the whites, black agents do commit more crimes, that is for the same asset level they
perpetrate more crimes, and they decide to do so more often, that is their crime functions decrease
more slowly.29
[Figure (10) about here]
[Figure (11) about here]
6.2 Who Commits Crimes?
Given the optimal policy functions and the stationary distributions we can discuss the predictions
of the model as far as the crime rates are concerned. First, we compute the percentage of agents
that steal at least $50 dollars in a period, that is whose income from illegitimate activities is at least
0.00189. As for the black population, almost every high school dropout is involved in property crimes,
deﬁned as above. The precise ﬁgures are 89.0% for employed people and 90.3% for the unemployed. As
for the white high school dropouts, these values are somewhat diﬀerent, being 68.3% for the employed
and 75.7% for the unemployed. In comparison, as for the high school graduates, 8.0% of the black
employed and 22.6% of the unemployed are involved in property crimes, while no white employed and
29Notice that, as far as crime is concerned, the presence of the wh workers in the economy is perceived as a positive
externality by the bl workers, since wh workers receive a higher labour income in equilibrium. This rises the incentives
for the bl agents to commit crimes. This is why it is crucial to include explicitely diﬀerent races in the model rather
than running separately the model calibrated in turn for the two races. The same comments apply for agents with low
education levels when compared to people with higher ones.
211.7% of the unemployed are. Finally, only 2.0% of black college graduates and 0.7% of white college
graduates who are unemployed decide to resort to crime. These results are reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
These results deserve some further discussion. The numbers above highlight how bad labor market
conditions and poverty can make criminal activities more appealing, leading black individuals to resort
to stealing to overcome the economic disadvantage they are facing in the legitimate activities. This
result is consistent with the stylized facts described before, which showed a deﬁnitely higher crime
involvement for the black population. Moreover, this model shows that is possible to get big diﬀerences
in criminal behaviors according to race even without relying on a social interaction framework. The
combination of the dynamic set-up, the limited legitimate rewards for the dropouts and the temptation
induced by well paid workers are the basic ingredients that allow for this result. First, agents with
poor labor market prospects accumulate little assets: this is due both to their low income and to
the relatively frequent unemployment spells they experience. Poverty is then driving the stealing
decisions. If it is possible to name the diﬀerent labor market conditions with the term discrimination,
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), then it is clear how bad are the dynamic eﬀects implied by it,
which would be even greater if we were to introduce a stigma eﬀect for the convicted criminals.
6.3 Model Vs. Data
In order to assess the performance of the model, we compare four variables of interest to the corre-
sponding ﬁgures in the FBI and BJS data for 1996. Namely, we consider the ratio of the arrest rates
by race, the percentage of inmates by education, the percentage of inmates by employment at the
time of the arrest and the percentage of inmates by race. Table 5 reports these variables.
As for the arrest rates by race ratio, the model implies a number very close to the data provided
by the FBI: 4.04 versus 4.48. It is worth stressing that the large race crime gap is obtained only from
the diﬀerences in labor market conditions and asset holding, that is without resorting to any imitation
mechanism among agents. The diﬀerent legitimate conditions account for 90% of the race crime gap
observed in the data.
As for the inmates composition by education, the model tracks the data very well. The discrep-
ancies between the model and the data are modest.
Finally, the model performs fairly well in accounting for both the employment status at the time
of the arrest and the race of the 1997 prison population.
22[Table 5 about here]
6.4 Experiments
This section is devoted to discuss some counterfactual experiments. First, some conceptual exercises
are performed, where the heterogeneity between the two races is reduced. Then, two policies implying
the same costs are compared.
As for the ﬁrst set of exercises, the results are found in table 6. The table reports both the race
arrest ratio implied by the model under consideration and the percent change in the crime rate with
respect to either the baseline model or a model where the two races are identical in every dimension.
The exercises are divided into two groups. First, in the top part of the table, we report the results
of making the two demographic groups equal in just one aspect. These are the models from 2 to 6.
Then, in the bottom part of the table, we report the results of making the two demographic groups
identical in every aspect but one. These are the models from 8 to 12.
In both types of exercise, the strongest eﬀect on the criminal behavior is found to be due to
the diﬀerence in eﬃciency units. Moreover, the results related to the change in the probability of
unemployment are a bit misleading. In these cases the percentage of people with negative assets
varies dramatically with respect to the benchmark case, explaining such big responses of the crime
rate and the sign of the change.
It is useful to compare our ﬁndings to those in Grogger (1998). Relying on an Oaxaca-type
decomposition applied to the NLSY79 data, Grogger (1998) ﬁnds that 26% of the racial diﬀerential
in crime participation rates is due to the black-white wage gap. We ﬁnd an even stronger eﬀect, since
model 9 accounts for 49% of the racial arrest ratio. As seen, the diﬀerence in eﬃciency units directly
maps to earnings diﬀerential and aﬀects heavily the crime decision. Understanding the determinants of
the wage gap is of paramount importance. As remarked before, there are many competing explanations
in the literature: the role of pre-market factors, taste discrimination, statistical discrimination and
specialization into jobs with lower wage growth. In this version of the model we assumed the eﬃciency
units gap to be exogenous. Considering explicitly the feedbacks from the labor market to the crime
one and viceversa seems to be an appropriate way to endogenise the wage diﬀerences.
[Table 6 about here]
23The second set of counterfactuals is aimed at understanding which public policy is more eﬀective
in reducing the aggregate crime rate. More precisely, a comparison between two policies implying
the same cost is carried out. The ﬁrst policy involves an increase in the income for the high school
dropouts, that is an improvement for the group with the worst economic condition. In contrast, the
second policy increases the likelihood of the punishment through an increase in the police expenditure.
Notice that for the policy comparisons to be more informative, the most crime prone groups need to
be modeled in a rather detailed way. This is one of reasons why it is very important to consider race
explicitly. The results of such experiments are reported in Table 7.
For the ﬁrst case, starting from the benchmark calibration, we compute the value of the high
school dropouts non asset income. Then we give a lump-sum subsidy to all dropouts worth 2.5% of
this value. Considering the number of people involved and the monetary value of the subsidy ($481),
this policy would imply a cost in per capita terms of $73. Then we solve the model under this new
speciﬁcation. The new model economy implies a decrease in the crime rate equal to 6.8%.
Given the cost of the ﬁrst policy, we consider another policy opposite in spirit to the ﬁrst one, i.e.
a policy which increases the likelihood of the punishment. Following Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert
(2000), we specify an apprehension technology of the form πa = 1 − G−γ, with G being the public
expenditure on police. To use this function, we need to estimate γ. In order to do so, we consider
the time series of the real per capita police expenditure and the time series of the property crimes
clearance rates.30 For the clearance rate, as before, we take the number of crimes cleared with an
arrest from the UCR and the total number of crimes from the NCVS. Then we rewrite the equation
above as 1 − πa = G−γ → ln(1 − πat) = −γ lnGt. Since both series are non stationary, we take ﬁrst
diﬀerences and estimate with OLS this equation in growth rates, i.e. ∆ln(1 − πat) = −γ∆lnGt.
The point estimate for γ is 0.04. Finally, increasing the police expenditure in 1996 by $73, from a
starting value of $127, we get the new value for πa=0.052. Then we solve the model with this higher
apprehension probability: the crime rate drops by 18.6%.
[Table 7 about here]
The table has an immediate interpretation. In terms of decreasing the aggregate crime rate, the
most eﬀective policy is the one that increases the expenditure on police, making a prison term more
likely for the criminals.
30This series is readily available from 1980 to 1999, see table 1.2 of the 2002 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,
US Dept of Justice.
247 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a model able to account for the observed diﬀerences in crime involvement
between black and white American males.
The overall assessment of the model suggests that it succeeds in generating the race crime gap, or
the higher involvement in crime of black versus white individuals. Blacks do commit disproportionately
more crime in the model: the model accounts for 90% of the race arrest ratio observed in 1996. In
addition, on the basis of counterfactual analysis, the race wage gap seems to be the most important
factor in shaping the crime diﬀerential, a channel already discussed by Grogger (1998) and Machin
and Meghir (2003). This paper has argued that if we are to understand the race crime gap it is of
paramount importance to understand what forces drive the observed diﬀerentials in the labor market.
The next step in the research is to obtain endogenously the labor market diﬀerences according to
race. It is reasonable to think that, given the dimension of the crime phenomenon in the US, there
are signiﬁcant feedback eﬀects going from the labor market to the crime market and viceversa. This
kind of considerations are potentially very important for agents with low educational levels, whose
criminal participation is particularly high. If training and hiring costs are non-negligible and if on the
job learning is an important component of the worker’s productivity, employers will accurately screen
the workforce trying to form a match only with those workers that maximize the expected proﬁts of
the relationship, with duration playing an important role. Obviously, the incarceration of a worker
represents an interruption of the employer/employee relationship. In the hiring process, given the
high historical race crime gap, employers could use race as a signal, that is they could statistically
discriminate among applicants on the basis of race. According to this story, unemployment, wage and
crime diﬀerences by race should be persistent. However, this explanation begs for a question: where
do the initial diﬀerences between races come from?
It goes without saying that the simple ﬁrms structure assumed in the current version of the model
cannot accommodate such an extension. First, the value of a ﬁrm must be non-zero in order for the
future to play a non trivial role on the current decisions. Second, the labor market should provide a
wage per worker type, rather than a wage per eﬃciency units.
Furthermore, the model considered here cannot take into consideration some crucial aspects of the
crime phenomenon. In ﬁrst instance, crime is primarily committed by people of young age, Leung
(1994), while our framework does not give age any role in determining the crime decisions. A feasible
extension, in order to capture in a parsimonious way the life-cycle dimension of the property crime
participation, is to specify a perpetual youth model. This way the framework could allow easily for
two diﬀerent and important aspects: 1) temporary stigma eﬀects in the labor market for convicted















Figure 1: Property crimes arrest rates per 100.000 males by race (Whites, blue line and right scale).
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Figure 11: Crime Functions (Whites - Dropouts)
36Year Robberies Whites (%) Blacks (%) Other N/A
1996 655800 36.8 51.5 7.5 4.2
1997 565010 38.1 43.0 14.8 4.2
1998 547500 44.3 39.6 10.1 6.0
1999 465430 42.4 46.5 7.0 4.2
2000 407490 37.1 47.7 12.3 2.8
2001 340910 44.9 47.4 6.1 1.6
Table 1: Race of Robbery Oﬀenders - NCVS
37Blacks Whites
Ethnic (rescaled) share in the NLSY97 33.4% 66.6%
Stolen something worth less than $50 29.5% 70.5%
Stolen something worth more than $50 36.0% 64.0%
Other Property Crimes 35.2% 64.8%
Table 2: Property Crimes in the NLSY97 - 2001
38Parameter Value Target
Model Period 12.3 months Average Prison term period





hra,ed See text Data from CPS
εra,ed See text From a regression on CPS data
ψra,ed See text Data from CPS
bwh −0.655 15.0% of whites with negative net worth
bbl −1.152 31.3% of blacks with negative net worth
ca 0.0984 Inmates consumption =$2,600
η 0.0439 One crime is worth $1,253
πa 0.0492 Data from NCVS and UCR
J 0.3721 Expenditure per arrest =$10,610
φ 0.5 US unemployment beneﬁts legislation
πra,ed (.,u￿) See text Data from CPS
Table 3: Calibration
39% Committing Crime Employed Unemployed
Blacks - Dropouts 89.0 90.3
Blacks - High School 8.0 22.6
Blacks - College 0 2.0
Whites - Dropouts 68.3 75.7
Whites - High School 0 1.7
Whites - College 0 0.7
Table 4: Shares of Speciﬁc Groups Committing Crimes
40Variable Model Data
Arrest Rates Ratio (B/W) 4.04 4.48
Inmates Dropouts 54.6% 57.5%
Inmates High School 39.9% 36.3%
Inmates College 5.5% 6.2%
Inmates Employed 86.8% 71.3%
Inmates Unemployed 13.2% 28.7%
Inmates Blacks 44.3% 40.4%
Inmates Whites 55.7% 59.6%
Table 5: Model Vs. Data
41Model Arrest Ratio Crime Rate Change
1) Baseline 4.04 -
2) Equal Borrowing Limit 3.43 -5.15%
3) Equal Eﬃciency Units 1.75 -13.38%
4) Equal labor Supplies 3.09 -5.45%
5) Equal Unemployment 4.16 +2.17%
6) Equal Education 3.28 -4.27%
7) Everything Equal 1 -
8) Diﬀerent Borrowing Limit 1.14 +1.57%
9) Diﬀerent Eﬃciency Units 2.22 +4.93%
10) Diﬀerent labor Supplies 1.31 -0.07%
11) Diﬀerent Unemployment 0.96 -1.69%
12) Diﬀerent Education 1.23 -0.07
Table 6: Counterfactual Experiments
42Experiment Crime Rate Change
Lump-sum subsidy to dropouts -6.8%
Increased apprehension probability -18.6%
Table 7: Policy Experiments
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Appendix A - Solution Algorithm
The computational procedure used to solve the baseline model can be represented by the following
algorithm:
• Generate discrete grids over the asset space [bra,...,amax];
• Get the invariant distributions over s associated with Πra,ed;
• Get the equilibrium tax rate on labor income τU;
• Get the aggregate labor supply L;
• Guess the aggregate crime rate πv0;
• Guess the criminal justice tax rate τJ0;
• Compute the insurance price pI = ηyπv0;
• Guess on the interest rate r0;
• Get the capital demand and the wage rate w;
• Get the average non asset legitimate income y;
• Get the crime functions crra,ed (a,s);
• Get the saving functions a￿
ra,ed (a,s);
• Get the stationary distributions µra,ed(a,s);
• Check asset market clearing; Get r1;
• Update r￿
0 = /r0 + (1 − /)r1 (with / arbitrary weight);
• Iterate until market clearing;
• Check ﬁnal good market clearing;
47• Get the aggregate crime rate πv1;
• Update π￿
v0 = ξπv0 + (1 − ξ)πv1 (with ξ arbitrary weight);
• Get the criminal justice tax rate τJ1;
• Update τ￿
J0 = ζτJ0 + (1 − ζ)τJ1 (with ζ arbitrary weight);
• Iterate until convergence.
Appendix B - Data Description
Description
The data used in this paper come from several diﬀerent sources.
1. The Uniform Crime Rate (UCR): is developed and maintained by the FBI. It can be obtained
from http://149.101.22.40/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm. The FBI
categories were amended, excluding Arson and considering robberies as a property crime rather
than a violent one. More precise deﬁnitions follow.
• Robbery - The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control
of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in
fear.
• Burglary - breaking or entering - The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft.
Attempted forcible entry is included.
• Larceny-theft (except motor vehicle theft) - The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding
away of property from the possession or constructive possession of another. Examples are thefts
of bicycles or automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing of any property
or article which is not taken by force and violence or by fraud. Attempted larcenies are included.
Embezzlement, conﬁdence games, forgery, worthless checks, etc., are excluded.
• Motor vehicle theft - The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. A motor vehicle is
self-propelled and runs on the surface and not on rails. Motorboats, construction equipment,
airplanes, and farming equipment are speciﬁcally excluded from this category.
482. National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS): is the Nation’s primary source of information on
criminal victimization. Each year, data are obtained from a nationally representative sample of
42,000 households comprising nearly 76,000 persons on the frequency, characteristics and conse-
quences of criminal victimization in the United States. For more information on the methodology
of this survey and to download the data see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict.htm.
3. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
• NLSY 79: is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were
14-22 years old when they were ﬁrst surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed annu-
ally through 1994 and are currently interviewed on a biennial basis. For more information on the
methodology of these surveys and to download the data see http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm
• NLSY 97: consists of a nationally representative sample of approximately 9,000 youths who
were 12 to 16 years old as of December 31, 1996. Round 1 of the survey took place in 1997. In
that round, both the eligible youth and one of that youth’s parents received hour-long personal
interviews. Youths continue to be interviewed on an annual basis. For more information on the
methodology of these surveys and to download the data see and http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy97.htm.
4. Current Population Survey (CPS): is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted
by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has been con-
ducted for more than 50 years. The CPS is the primary source of information on the labor
force characteristics of the U.S. population. The sample is scientiﬁcally selected to repre-
sent the civilian noninstitutional population. Data and codebooks can be downloaded from
http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm.
5. Census: see http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/black.html.
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